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It is commonly assumed that parents are important sources 
of socially learned behavior and beliefs. However, the empir­
ical evidence that parents are cultural models is ambiguous, 
and debates continue over their importance. A formal theory 
that examines the evolution of psychological tendencies to 
imitate parents (vertical transmission) and to imitate non­
parent adults (oblique transmission) in stochastic fluctuating 
environments points to forces that sometimes make vertical 
transmission adaptive, but oblique transmission recovers 
more quickly from rapid environmental change. These results 
suggest that neither mode of transmission should be expected 
to dominate the other across all domains. Vertical transmis­
sion may be preferred when ( 1 ) learned behavior affects fer­
tility rather than survival to adulthood, (2 ) the relevant en­
vironment is stable, or (3) selection is strong. For those 
interested in the evolution of social learning in diverse taxa, 
these models provide predictions for use in comparative 
studies.
Given the tremendous attention paid to parents and parenting 
in popular culture, one might think that the science of parents’ 
social influence had been worked out long ago. In contrast 
to the situation in the genetic arena, where the fact that every 
child has exactly two biological parents who contribute ap­
proximately equal amounts of hereditary material has led to 
powerful deductions about behavior and evolution, in the 
cultural arena surprisingly little is known about how much 
behavior and belief children acquire from their parents via 
social learning. The resolution of this issue is very important, 
because different patterns of social learning generate different 
patterns of adult behavior and even very different cultural 
evolutionary dynamics (Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman 1981; 
Boyd and Richerson 1985; Barth 1990). Debates ranging from 
the causes of crime to the nature of intelligence may hinge 
on an accurate understanding of how much and when chil-
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dren preferentially learn from their parents as opposed to 
peers or nonparent adults.
Some anthropologists have claimed evidence of the im­
portance of transmission of culture from parents to children 
(vertical transmission), at least in some domains (Cavalli- 
Sforza et al. 1982; Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza 1986; Gugliel- 
rnino et al. 1995; Hewlett, De Silvestri, and Guglielmino 
2002). Each of these studies is valuable, but each has flaws 
that make it easy for skeptics to doubt its inferences. A classic 
study of correlations among college students, their parents, 
and their friends by Cavalli-Sforza et al. (1982) is sometimes 
cited as providing evidence of vertical transmission, but the 
observed correlations may arise from correlations between 
parents and unmeasured nonparents, as well as simply from 
the genetic heritability of traits. Also, parent-offspring cor­
relations observed in young children may not persist when 
the children are older and have been exposed to many other 
cultural models. In one of the best empirical studies of the 
problem, Aunger (2000) studied the transmission of food 
taboos in the Ituri Forest. The analysis suggests that, while 
initial taboos are acquired from parents, later horizontal adult 
transmission has a huge effect on the resulting pattern of 
variation.
Aunger (2000) further argued that self-report of parental 
influence often reflects a normative reporting bias. A unique 
study by Hewlett and Cavalli-Sforza (1986) is also cited as 
presenting evidence of vertical transmission (although the pa­
per itself argues for some complexity in the process). The key 
problem there is that the only evidence of learning from par­
ents is self-report, and behavior varies so little in the com­
munity that it would probably be impossible to determine 
which learning pattern generated adult behavior. Even ac­
curate self-report in this case would not mean that people 
would not eagerly imitate nonparents to acquire new tech­
niques or technologies.
Population-level studies that claim evidence of learning 
from parents (Guglielmino et al. 1995; Hewlett et al. 2002) 
suffer from the limitation that some important domains, such 
as language, are known to be eagerly learned from nonparents 
and show strong in-group correlations through time (the 
“group effect" mentioned by Hewlett et al. 2002)— exactly the 
pattern used to infer transmission from parents. Furthermore, 
pure learning from parents does not lead to conservation of 
between-group variation unless there is no migration among 
groups. Exactly as in the genetic case, small amounts of mi­
gration are sufficient to unify subpopulations with respect to 
drift (Wright 1931). Therefore, simple parent-child social 
learning cannot explain the finding that some elements of 
culture vary mainly among groups rather than within them 
(Henrich and Boyd 1998).
While the above studies do not manage to distinguish be­
tween the competing hypotheses, they do show that observed 
patterns of variation are often consistent with vertical social 
learning— an important condition for investing in future re­
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search. However, these patterns are also consistent with many 
forms of oblique and horizontal transmission. There is good 
reason to worry over merely consistent results. Studies that 
claim evidence of vertical cultural transmission usually do not 
control for the fact that parents and offspring share half of 
their genes. Once genetic sources of parent-child correlation 
in, for example, personality characteristics are accounted for, 
very little to no correlation remains to be explained (for a 
review of this literature, see Harris 1999). On the basis of 
such evidence, some developmental psychologists have made 
strong arguments that parents are not, in fact, a child’s pre­
ferred targets for social learning (Harris 1999). They argue 
instead that children are eager imitators of peers and pres­
tigious adults. At minimum, these arguments should caution 
us against simply interpreting the existence of parent-child 
correlations as evidence of vertical cultural transmission.
In summary, while claims are sometimes made that vertical 
cultural transmission is strong (Shennan and Steele 1999; La- 
land, Odling-Smee, and Feldman 2000), we find the evidence 
ambiguous. In light of this empirical ambiguity, it would be 
helpful to have a family of models to aid in understanding 
the adaptive design of vertical social learning. When would 
natural selection, if it had its way, favor learning from parents 
instead of from nonparents? There has been little analysis of 
this problem. Cavalli-Sforza and Feldman (1981) examined 
the cultural dynamics that result from vertical transmission, 
but they did not model when natural selection would favor 
such a learning strategy (see also Feldman and Zhivotovsky 
1992). Most formal models of the evolution of social learning 
have assumed either oblique or vertical transmission but not 
both (e.g., Rogers 1988; Boyd and Richerson 1995,1996; Feld­
man, Aoki, and Kumm 1996; Wakano, Aoki, and Feldman 
2004; Aoki, Wakano, and Feldman 2005). These models there­
fore do not help us understand when vertical social learning, 
relative to oblique, maybe adaptive. Takahasi (1999) analyzed 
models in which individuals could learn vertically or 
obliquely/horizontally and found vertical transmission to be 
favored in many circumstances. However, none of these mod­
els included environmental fluctuation. Such models may 
overestimate the importance of vertical social learning. Since 
models of the evolution of social learning suggest that en­
vironmental fluctuation favors social learning (Boyd and 
Richerson 1985) and since vertical transmission is analogous 
to adding an extra chromosome, it seems likely that envi­
ronmental fluctuation would select against vertical social 
learning just as it selects against direct genetic adaptation 
(Wakano et al. 2004).
This paper is the first to develop and analyze models of 
the simultaneous evolution of vertical and oblique social 
learning under stochastic environmental fluctuation. We con­
struct two models. In both models, individuals can learn for 
themselves (individual learning), learn from a parent (vertical 
social learning), or learn from a nonparent adult (oblique 
social learning). The mechanism of learning is controlled by 
a single genetic locus, and learned behavior affects fitness in
one of two ways. In the first model, learned behavior affects 
fertility. In the second model, learned behavior affects survival 
to adulthood. We show that, in model 1, stable environments 
and strong selection favor vertical social learning. The reason 
is that mere existence can serve as a cue to a naive individual 
that its parent did something right. However, when the en­
vironment fluctuates more frequently, oblique social learning 
is advantaged, because it allows novel adaptive behavior to 
be acquired more quickly. In model 2, in which selection acts 
on survival to adulthood rather than fertility, selection does 
not favor vertical social learning unless that learning is in­
herently more accurate.
These results suggest that neither mode of transmission 
should be expected to dominate the other across all domains. 
Those who believe that vertical or oblique transmission does 
dominate will need both better evidence and additional mod­
els to demonstrate that dominance. At the end of this paper, 
we suggest additional relevant theory and discuss predictions 
derived from our models.
The Models
We constructed two models that differ only in the way se­
lection operates. In the first, selection operates on fertility by 
increasing or decreasing the number of expected offspring. 
In the second, selection acts on viability by leaving family size 
unchanged but altering the probability that a child survives 
to reproduce. Population biologists often distinguish between 
these two modes of selection because they may favor different 
adaptations. Most elements of the two models are identical, 
and therefore we explain the common structure before in­
troducing the specifics of each.
Basic Model Structure
We begin with a model structure similar to one used to explore 
the evolution of oblique transmission (Rogers 1988). Then 
we add an allele that leads an individual to learn from its 
parents. In an environment that can have any of an infinite 
number of states, at any one time a single behavior is optimal 
for the current state of the environment. All other behavior 
leaves fitness unchanged from a baseline w0. In each gener­
ation, after offspring are born but before they have a chance 
to acquire behavior the state of the environment can change, 
rendering all previous behavior nonoptimal. The state of the 
environment in any generation t is given by ut. If the envi­
ronment has just changed to a new state, then u, =  1. This 
happens with probability u. Otherwise, u, =  0. All individuals 
in the population experience the same environment and can­
not detect when a change occurs.
The population is very large, and generations are discrete 
and nearly nonoverlapping. Young individuals can observe 
and learn from adults, but no individual survives for two 
generations. An individual’s learning strategy is determined 
by a single allele, and inheritance is haploid and sexual, under
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random mating. Individual learners (I) ignore the previous 
generation and explore the environment themselves. They 
always acquire currently optimal behavior but also pay a cost 
of learning. Oblique social learners (S) acquire the behavior 
of a random member of the previous generation. Vertical 
social learners (V) copy one of their two parents with equal 
probability. Thus, we assume that social learners who acquire 
adaptive behavior have the highest fitness, A, followed by 
individual learners, who have fitness B. Social learners who 
imitate someone with maladaptive behavior have the lowest 
fitness, C. Mating is random, and the reproduction of an 
individual is the product of its own fitness (A, B, or C) and 
that of its mate. We analyzed an equivalent additive model 
and derived all the same conclusions. However, since fitness 
effects must be multiplicative in model 2 , making them mul­
tiplicative in both models makes it easier to compare the 
results.
To model the possibility that imitating parents is easier and 
more accurate than imitating nonparents, we reduce the odds 
of successful oblique social learning by a factor 1 — k. This 
assumption arises from the intuition that parents may have 
stronger motivation than nonparents to teach adaptive be­
havior and be more available to imitate. When k =  0, oblique 
and vertical social learning are equally accurate. When k =  
0 .1 , imitating a nonparent is, on average, 1 0 % less accurate 
than imitating a parent.
Under the above assumptions, we can construct a mating 
table that specifies the probabilities of occurrence of each type 
of family and the expected number of offspring of each family 
type (table 1). From this table, it is possible to write recursions 
for the frequencies of five types of individuals in the popu­
lation after mating and learning: individual learners with op­
timal behavior {¥), oblique learners with and without optimal 
behavior (s( and s'0> respectively), and vertical learners with 
and without optimal behavior (v( and v ’Q, respectively). These 
recursions are built from table 1 by multiplying the probability 
of each mating (col. 3) by the fertility of that mating (col. 4) 
and the proportion of offspring of a given type from that 
mating (cols. 5-9). Each row yields a product of three columns 
of this kind, and the products are added to produce a total 
number of offspring of a given type in the next generation. 
This expression is finally divided by the average fitness (the 
sum products of cols. 3 and 4) to produce a complete re­
cursion for the frequency of the type.
In model 1, we assume that average family size is the prod­
uct of the fertilities of the two parents (see table 1). Baseline 
individual fertility is w0. We let adaptive behavior increase an 
individual’s fertility by a factor b>  1. Individual learners have 
their fertility reduced by a factor c< 1 , such that their fitness 
is multiplied by bc> 1. Thus, in this model, A  =  w0b, B =  
w0bc, and C =  w0.
In model 2, we assume that average family size is a constant, 
w0, by setting all individual fertilities to this value (see table 
1). We let adaptive behavior increase an individual’s chances 
of surviving to adulthood by a factor b > 1. Individual learners
have their survival chances reduced by a factor c< 1, such 
that their fitness is multiplied by bc> 1. Thus, in this model, 
A  =  B =  C =  w0. To construct recursions that account for 
differences in survival to adulthood, we modify the recursions 
that arise from table 1. Each recursion is multiplied by the 
viability factors of that type:
,, hbc 
J =  t —rr ,
w
hb
Si Sx „t ,
w
where h is the baseline chance of survival to adulthood and 
vJ =  i'hbc + (s( +  v()hb + (s„ +  v„)Ij is the average fitness af­
ter survival is accounted for. The factor h divides out in each 
case and never affects differential fitness.
Stationary Distributions and Stability Conditions
The recursions for each model are difficult to analyze, because 
this is a stochastic system and therefore the state variables 
will never reach equilibrium. However, it is possible to take 
the expectation over environments of each recursion and solve 
for steady-state values of the expected state variables because 
the system does eventually reach a steady state at which each 
state value (i, sp s0, and v j  is drawn from a stationary dis­
tribution (fig. 1). If we know the expected value of this dis­
tribution, we can still understand a great deal about how the 
system behaves.
A more formal explanation of this process may be found 
in the CA+ online supplements. For each recursion, we de­
rived what we call an “expected-value recursion” by taking 
the expectation over states of the environment (changed or 
unchanged). This yielded four new recursions in terms of u, 
not ut. We then solved for possible stable values of these 
expected values to produce means of the stationary distri­
bution of the state variables E(i), E ^ ), E(s0), E ^ ) . With the 
steady-state frequencies of types in hand, we conducted linear 
stability analysis (see McElreath and Boyd 2007, chap. 7, for 
examples) at these expected values in order to derive con­
ditions under which each characteristic steady state (“equi­
librium” of the expected values) is stable (supplement A). We 
then verified the cogency of these deductions with stochastic 
simulations.
The equilibria and their stability conditions are summa­
rized in table 2. There are four equilibria in each model. Only 
one is stable for any given combination of the parameters, 
meaning that initial conditions do not matter provided that
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Table 1. Mating Table for Models 1 and 2
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P a r e n t
1
P a r e n t
2 F r eq u en cy Fer ti lity I
P ro b ab i l i t i e s  o f  O f f sp r in g
SI SO VI VO
[ [ > B 2 1 0 0 0 0
[ SI 2 is, BA 1/2 ( 1 / 2 ) / d / 2 ) ( l  -  / ) 0 0
[ SO 2 is„ BC 1/2 ( 1 / 2 ) / (1 /2X1 -  / ) 0 0
[ VI 2 IV, BA 1/2 0 0 (1 /2 K .(2 ) (1/2)11 -  r,( 2)J
[ VO 2 iv„ BC 1/2 0 0 ( 1 / 2 W D (1/2)11 -  rv( 1 )J
SI SI sf A 2 0 r' 1 -  / 0 0
SI so 2s, s„ A C 0 r 1 -  / 0 0
SI VI 2s, v, A 2 0 (1/2  ) / (1 /2X1 -  / ) (1 /2 K .(2 ) (1/2)11 -  rv(2 ) J
SI VO 2s, v0 A C 0 ( 1 / 2 ) / (1 /2X1 -  / ) ( 1 / 2 W D (1/2)11 -  rv( 1 )J
so so SQ c2 0 / 1 -  / 0 0
so VI 2 s„v, CA 0 ( 1 / 2 ) / (1 /2X1 -  / ) (1 /2 K .(1 ) (1/2)11 -  rj, 1 )J
so VO 2s0v0 c2 0 ( 1 / 2 ) / (1 /2X1 -  / ) 0 1/2
VI VI V, A 2 0 0 0 rv(2) 1 -  r J 2 )
VI VO 2v,vu A C 0 0 0 r j l ) 1 -  r j  1)
VO VO k; c2 0 0 0 0 1
N o te : 1, S, a n d  V  re p re s e n t in d iv id u a l , o b liq u e , a n d  v e rtic a l le a rn e rs , respective ly . SI a n d  V I a re  socia l le a rn e rs  w h o  a c q u ire d  a d a p tiv e  b e h a v io r  a n d  
SO a n d  VO le a rn e rs  w h o  a c q u ire d  m a la d a p tiv e  b eh a v io r . T h e  sy m b o ls  /, s,, s,„ v , , a n d  v„ c o r re s p o n d  to  th e  freq u e n c ie s  o f  ea ch  ty p e  in  th e  p o p u la t io n .  
T h e  fre q u e n c y  o f  c u r re n t ly  a d a p tiv e  b e h a v io r  le a rn e d  by in d iv id u a ls  in  th e  p re v io u s  g e n e ra tio n  is g iv e n  by r ' — (1 — M,X1 -  k) ( t  +  s, +  v ,). T h e  
f u n c t io n  r j x )  =  (1 — u , ) ( ] / 2 ) x  g ives th e  p ro b a b ili ty  o f  a c q u ir in g  a d a p tiv e  b e h a v io r  v ia v e rtica l socia l le a rn in g , w h e n  .v o f  a n  in d iv id u a l’s p a re n ts  
a c q u ire d  a d a p tiv e  b e h a v io r  in  th e  p re v io u s  g e n e ra tio n .
all strategies are initially present at some frequency. At equi­
librium 1, individual learning can be the only strategy. At 
equilibrium 2 , both individual learning and oblique social 
learning can coexist, but vertical social learning is excluded. 
At equilibrium 3, both individual learning and vertical social 
learning can coexist, but oblique social learning is excluded. 
At equilibrium 4, vertical social learning alone may persist in 
the long run. The expected values of the state variables at 
each equilibrium are summarized in table 3.
Individual learners must exist at some frequency in order 
for the population to track the environment. Nevertheless, 
equilibrium 4 is possible because these are the expected values 
of the state variables, not constant values. At this last equi­
librium, rare individual learners are favored immediately after 
a change in the environment (when ut =  1 ), but selection 
then purges them again. In the long run, the expected con­
tribution to descendant generations of any given individual 
learning allele is zero, even though the presence of these alleles 
is important for the dynamics of the system and the continued 
dominance of vertical social learning.
The equilibrium dynamics for both models are easy to 
visualize by plotting each stability condition as a function of 
c. Then the regions of u and c that produce the different 
equilibrium outcomes can be plotted in a two-dimensional 
space for fixed values of b and k. In each case, individual 
learning is favored when the environment is unstable and 
learning is inexpensive, and vertical social learning is favored 
when the environment is stable. Oblique social learning and 
vertical social learning do not coexist at a deterministic steady 
state, although fluctuating selection may maintain both in the 
population. It is important to note that vertical social learning
never invades in model 2 if k = 0. Instead, it is neutrally 
stable with oblique social learning. However, fluctuating se­
lection immediately after a change in the environment favors 
oblique social learning (as we explain in detail below), sup­
pressing the frequency of vertical social learning and effec­
tively allowing oblique learning to dominate in the long run. 
Even when k>  0, vertical social learning has a smaller domain 
of attraction in model 2  than in model 1 .
Generation
Figure 1. Forward simulation of the true stochastic dynamics of 
model 1; b = 1 .1, c = 0.93, k = 0, u = 0.3. Solid lines, temporal 
dynamics of the frequencies of individual learning (black), 
oblique social learning (light gray), and vertical social learning 
(dark gray). Dashed lines, expected values of the stationary dis­
tributions of each. After an initial period of adjustment, the 
population forever fluctuates around these expected values, and 
we analyze formal expressions for these (table 3) to deduce the 
effects of the parameters on the behavior of the model.
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Table 2. Stability Conditions for Models 1 and 2
Stability C onditions 
E quilibrium  M odel 1 M odel 2
, be- 1 , be- 1
1 W > 1  U >  I (i,— i)(i — *)
3 u >  1 — c u >  1 — c, k >  0
4 u <  1 — c u <  1 — cy k >  0
N ote: D erived from  linear stability analysis o f  expected-value recursions.
Because the actual dynamics of the system are stochastic, 
we also conducted simulations with discrete stochastic en­
vironmental fluctuations instead of the expected values used 
in the formal analysis above (supplement B). This allowed us 
to verify the cogency of the analysis. When we plotted the 
average frequency of each type of learning— individual, 
oblique social, and vertical social— over the last 1 ,0 0 0  gen­
erations of 4,000-generation-long simulations, with initial fre­
quencies set equal across all five types, the qualitative out­
comes were the same as the analytical solutions. Therefore, 
while we have been unable to work with exact analytical de­
scriptions of the stochastic dynamics (this is not surprising; 
see Gillespie 1994, chap. 4), stochastic simulations suggest 
that the qualitative insights of the expected-value analysis are 
accurate. However, the analytic results tend to overestimate 
the range of parameter values that lead to the invasion of 
vertical social learning, especially when selection is strong 
( b »  1).
Discussion: When Does Vertical Social 
Learning Evolve?
Our analyses show that vertical social learning evolves in more 
stable environments, lending support to earlier suggestions 
that this may be true (Laland, Richerson, and Boyd 1996; 
Henrich and Boyd 1998; Hewlett and Lamb 2002). To un­
derstand why decreasing amounts of environmental change 
lead from individual learning to oblique and then to vertical 
social learning, it is helpful to understand what effect favors 
vertical social learning at all. Two antagonistic forces affect 
whether oblique or vertical social learning is adaptive. One 
is that vertical social learning benefits from a simple heuristic 
arising from selection on fertility. The second is that vertical 
social learning does not recover as quickly as oblique social 
learning from environmental change.
What Favors Vertical Transmission?
The main benefit of vertical social learning arises from the 
fact that the existence of a child indicates, on average, that 
its parents behaved correctly. Figure 2 illustrates how this can 
result in a greater probability of acquiring adaptive behavior 
through imitating a parent rather than a nonparent adult,
provided that individual learners are not too common and 
that the general amount of adaptive behavior in the popu­
lation is not too low (supplement C). This advantage of ver­
tical social learning arises because, at least in model 1 , parents 
with adaptive behavior produce more offspring. All other 
things being equal, this favors adopting the parents’ strategy. 
On average, families in which there is the greatest chance of 
acquiring adaptive behavior through imitating parents will 
have more children. Over multiple generations, this effect 
multiplies itself as the lineage increases in size. Thus, the 
thought experiment in figure 2  underrepresents the magni­
tude of the advantage. When selection is strong (i.e., b is 
large), this effect is of course stronger, and the domain of 
attraction for vertical social learning grows. No similar effect 
occurs in model 2 , where family size does not depend on 
learned behavior.
W hat Favors Oblique Transmission?
Whether alleles leading to vertical social learning spread in 
the population in the long run will also depend, however, on 
the rate of environmental change. One way to see vertical 
social learning is as a separate, nongenetic chromosome. Be­
haviors acquired in this way will recombine with alleles at the 
same rate as alleles on different chromosomes—  50%, which 
is substantial. However, oblique social learning has an even 
larger recombination rate (fig. 3). Through imitating non­
parents in a large population, naive individuals essentially 
immediately reach equilibrium covariance between their al­
leles and learned behavior. The main advantage of this is that 
it affords them better access to individual learners, who are 
generating new adaptive information. Vertical social learners 
will eventually arrive at the same or a similar chance of ac­
quiring adaptive behavior, but that will take a number of 
generations. Because an individual is a vertical social learner, 
at least one of its parents was also a vertical social learner. 
Imitating a parent then entails the likelihood of imitating an
Table 3. Steady-State Expected Frequencies of Individual 




M odel 1 M odel 2
E (/) a £(/) a
1 1
b e -  1
1
b e-1
2 i — £-)( i — h)( 1 — A:) b - l c ( b - l )
2((*r—1)[m—(1 —c)] b e -  1 2((»c-1 )[h- ( 1 - c)] b e -  1
3 (1 — c)(l — u) i»-l ( 1 ”  £■)( 1 ”  !<) c(b— 1)
4 0
K i - h) - i
i»-l 0
K 1 -h)-1
N ote: Since there  are a t m ost tw o learn ing  types expected a t steady state, 
the  frequency o f  the  o th e r learn ing  allele is always 1 — E(z). W here a  is 
the  frequency o f  adaptive behav io r am ong  social learners, a  =  
E (S i) / [ l  — E(/ )]  fo r oblique social learn ing  an d  a  =  E (v , ) / [1  — E(z)] fo r 
vertical social learning.
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Vertical social learning:
(1) H--------------O O P ----------- (1/2)O O O O + O O O + O O ' ' 0 0 0 0 + 0 0 0 + 0 0
oo
0000+000+00 (0) =  (4 +  3 /2 ) /9  =  0.611
Oblique social learning:
■ (1 /4 )+ ^ ^ - ° ° °  -  -  (2 /4 )
0000+000+00v ' 7 0000+000+00'
+oooo^ o+ oo(3/4) = 4/9 = °-444
Figure 2. How imitating parents can increase the odds of acquiring adap­
tive behavior. Filled circles at top represent three mated pairs: gray, adap­
tive behavior; black, maladaptive behavior. Pairs with more adaptive be­
havior produce more offspring. The chance of acquiring adaptive 
behavior when imitating a parent (either, at random) is computed by 
first computing the chance that a given child comes from a type of pairing 
and then multiplying each of those probabilities by the odds of acquiring 
adaptive behavior, which is the proportion of parents who have adaptive 
behavior, in that pair. The chance of acquiring adaptive behavior via 
oblique transmission is instead computed by using the proportion of 
nonparents who have the adaptive behavior. (In a large population, this 
will simply be the population average frequency.) Because pairs with more 
adaptive behavior produce more offspring, it makes sense to imitate 
parents. The fact that one is a child essentially becomes a cue that, on 
average, one’s parents behaved correctly. This example is informative only 
when the environment does not change too rapidly and individual learn­
ers are not too common.
imitator, which is not good unless most behavior is already 
adaptive. This difference in recombination rate means that 
oblique learners will tend to acquire adaptive behavior more 
quickly after a change in the environment unless selection is 
very strong (b > 2c(l — k)) (supplements C, D). Eventually, as 
new adaptive behavior filters through the population, vertical 
social learning catches up with and may even surpass oblique 
social learning, but if the environment changes again first, 
vertical social learners lose, on average.
These factors explain why, when k = 0 in model 2 (selec­
tion on viability), selection never favors vertical social learn­
ing. Vertical social learning has no value in that case because 
all families are the same size. Thus, a major advantage to 
vertical social learning that arises in model 1 , in which se­
lection is on fertility, never appears here. If all families are 
the same size, the fact that one exists contains no information 
about the adaptedness of one’s parents’ behavior. Oblique 
transmission’s advantage when the environment changes still 
exists in this model. Thus, provided that k =  0, selection 
always favors oblique social learning if it favors any social 
learning at all. If k>  0, however, vertical social learning can 
invade just because it is more accurate than oblique social 
learning. Oblique social learning is advantaged when the en­
vironment changes, and if it changes often enough, oblique 
social learning can displace vertical.
To summarize, these models offer us three lessons about 
the evolutionary logic of these learning strategies. First, ver­
tical social learning is very similar to innate genetic adapta-
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Figure 3. How imitating nonparents can increase the odds of acquiring 
adaptive behavior. Symbols are as in figure 2, but we also indicate in­
dividual learners with I. Just after a change in the environment—indicated 
by the dotted line—all social learners acquire maladaptive behavior. A 
single individual learner, however, acquires newly adaptive behavior. The 
offspring of these individuals now face the decision (or natural selection 
does) of how they should acquire behavior. Two of these offspring are 
individual learners, like one of their parents. The rest decide (or natural 
selection does) between vertical and oblique social learning. Vertical social 
learners will acquire adaptive behavior 1/10 of the time. Oblique social 
learners will acquire adaptive behavior 2/10 of the time. Oblique trans­
mission has the advantage in this example because the recent change in 
the environment has made adaptive behavior rare. Individual learners 
are the best source of adaptive behavior now, and, since social learning 
is heritable (being a social learner means that at least one parent is one), 
social learners will have better access to individual learners by learning 
from nonparents. This increased “recombination” rate between genes and 
cultural variants favors oblique social learning. However, if the environ­
ment does not change frequently enough, this advantage will be 
ephemeral.
tion: it tends to do well when behavioral flexibility is of little 
value. It is distinct from genetic adaptation, however, in that 
it does not rely on mutation to generate new variants. Even 
very rare individual learners, as in equilibrium 4, will produce 
“mutations” that are “biased” in an adaptive way that genetic 
mutations are not. Being able to acquire these positively biased 
new variants means that vertical social learning may still be 
able to adapt more quickly than innate genetic adaptation. 
Second, an additional advantage of imitating parents may be 
that they are easier to imitate, and this advantage can operate 
even when selection does not favor vertical social learning for 
any structural reason. Third, in contrast to vertical social 
learning, oblique social learning, combined with individual
learning, is a robust solution to even quite large temporal 
environmental stochasticity. W hen the environment changes 
rapidly, behavioral heritability is the enemy. Oblique social 
learning, by increasing the rate of recombination between 
genes and learned behavior, reduces this heritability and al­
lows more rapid adaptation.
Limits o f Our Models
We have necessarily made a number of simplifying assump­
tions in these analyses, and not just to make the model more 
tractable. Simple models are designed to help us understand 
the joint action of a specific number of forces. The assump­
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tions are strategic, just as controlling for confounding vari­
ables in experiments is strategic. Nevertheless, we could mod­
ify the model in a number of ways. We conclude by discussing 
two modifications that represent other hypotheses about what 
factors would change the balance of value between vertical 
and oblique cultural transmission.
All o f the social learning in the two models described above 
is “linear”: learners accurately replicate the frequency of adap­
tive behavior within the category of people they learn from. 
There are other social learning strategies, however, that are 
nonlinear, and nonlinear strategies have their advantages. Par­
ents are a very limited sample of the population. Models of 
success-biased imitation and majority-rule conformity suggest 
that both are adaptive learning heuristics in the proper con­
texts (Boyd and Richerson 1985; Henrich and Boyd 1998). 
There is also empirical evidence that humans employ both 
(Henrich and Gil-White 2001; McElreath et al. 2005). Using 
either depends on learning from nonparents.
The models here could be modified to allow oblique learn­
ers to compare the apparent success of candidate adults and 
preferentially imitate the adult with the highest observed fer­
tility (in model 1) or health (in model 2). For majority-rule 
conformity, individuals could sample n adults (possibly in­
cluding parents) and preferentially copy the most common 
behavior among them. Adding these strategies to the models 
would likely increase the range of parameters under which 
oblique social learning of some kind evolves. Parents may be 
part of one’s sample, but as neighborhoods increase in size, 
parents will have smaller and smaller effects on final learned 
behavior.
We qualify the above speculation by noting that oblique 
social learning may encourage the evolution of “parasitic” 
beliefs that are good at getting themselves copied but harmful 
to their carriers. For example, Richerson and Boyd (2005) 
suggest that some modern vocations, such as being a scientist, 
compromise reproduction but expose followers to wider au­
diences, thereby recruiting more members despite fitness 
losses. In a basic sense, any belief that manages to channel 
some of the believer’s energy into spreading the belief rather 
than pursuing fitness gains might be parasitic. Vertical social 
learning might be a good idea because it is partial inoculation 
against the evolution of such parasitic beliefs, just as vertical 
transmission of infection may reduce parasite virulence (An­
derson and May 1982; Ewald 1987). One could incorporate 
this idea into the models in this paper by allowing both adap­
tive and maladaptive behavior to mutate so that both reduce 
a carrier’s fitness by a factor p<  1 (for “parasite”) while in­
creasing the chance that its carrier will become a cultural 
model. One would then need to track four types (adaptive- 
normal, maladaptive-normal, adaptive-parasite, and mal- 
adaptive-parasite) for each learning strategy. This would 
greatly multiply the dimensionality of the system. Chances 
are that it would be impossible to derive the kind of analytical 
results we have presented here, but numerical analysis would 
still be possible and might be quite revealing.
Is Vertical Culture More Adaptive?
An important limitation of our models is common to many 
formal models of this kind. Socially learned behavior in our 
models is parasitic: a population consisting of oblique-social 
and individual learners, sustaining substantial culturally trans­
mitted behavior, has the same average fitness as a population 
consisting entirely of individual learners (Rogers 1988). This is 
a dissatisfying feature of the literature, because presumably 
something about human culture raises mean fitness (Boyd and 
Richerson 1995). One reviewer asked us to inquire of our mod­
els whether vertical social learning changed this result. Indeed 
it does, but only in the extreme case. From table 3, we can 
calculate the mean fitness at steady state in each equilibrium. 
In model 1, for the first three equilibria, the average fitness is 
w 2,b 2c2. This replicates Rogers’s result that oblique social learn­
ing does not increase adaptedness. For the fourth equilibrium, 
however, average fitness is given by w 2,b 2{ 1 — u)2. This is greater 
than w^b2c2 whenever u < 1 — c, which is the condition for this 
equilibrium to be stable. Likewise, in model 2, mean fitness 
after viability selection is the same in equilibria 1-3 but higher 
in equilibrium 4 whenever b( 1 — u)> be, which is true when­
ever the equilibrium is stable (k>  0  is also required, in this 
case). Thus, when vertical social learning excludes the other 
learning strategies, mean fitness does increase. Individual learn­
ers do fluctuate in and out of the population at the fourth 
equilibrium. Thus, the population gets the benefit of their in­
novations immediately after rare changes in the environment 
but does not pay much cost of sustaining them in the long 
run.
This result echoes a previously modeled way for social 
learning to increase mean fitness (Boyd and Richerson 1995). 
If individual learning is activated more when cheap or effec­
tive, then social learning can increase adaptedness. Therefore 
it is not necessarily anything special about vertical social learn­
ing that allows it to increase mean fitness while oblique can­
not. Instead, any pattern that falls back on social learning 
when individual learning is costly or unnecessary would pro­
duce the same result. For example, if individuals could guess 
to some degree when the environment had changed and learn 
individually, they would replicate the qualitative pattern at 
this fourth equilibrium. The simplest extension of the models 
in this paper that would address the adaptedness question 
directly would be to incorporate a chance of detecting non- 
adaptive behavior and activating individual learning in such 
a case (as in Boyd and Richerson 1995, 1996; Enquist, Er­
iksson, and Ghirlanda 2007). Our guess is that oblique social 
learning would then show the same effect on mean fitness as 
vertical social learning.
Predictions
Models of this sort are often most useful in helping to verify 
the logic of arguments or to clarify the relationships among 
concepts. Sometimes we are lucky and manage to extract
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qualitative predictions from them as well. In this case, our 
models imply that vertical social learning should be more 
common (1 ) in behavioral domains that affect fertility rather 
than survival, (2 ) when the behavior’s effective environment 
is stable, and (3) when selection is strong.
The first prediction will be upheld if there are stronger 
parent-offspring correlations in direct child-care behavior 
than in adult self-directed welfare behavior. For example, we 
might predict that mothers will preferentially imitate their 
own mothers when learning to care for their own children 
while they will not show a preference for a parent when learn­
ing about foraging techniques.
The second prediction will be upheld if the young take note 
of rapid changes in the world and pay less attention to parents 
and other elders as a result (see Mead 1978). In more stable 
times, preferential imitation of parents will be more common. 
The relevant environmental instability may also differ across 
domains. For example, knowledge of how to navigate by the 
stars is likely to remain useful over long time periods. A rare 
volcanic eruption may make another navigation technique 
adaptive, but the higher recombination rate of oblique social 
learning will be less useful in such a domain unless new re­
finements of navigation by constellations are constantly crop­
ping up. In contrast, knowledge of where to hunt and fish 
could become outdated very quickly as prey species move or 
are depleted. In this case, the higher recombination rate of 
oblique social learning could be highly adaptive.
Third, strong selection in model 1 increases the range of 
parameters that favor vertical social learning. Strong selection 
means greater variance in family size, and existence becomes 
a stronger cue that one’s parents did something right. In 
model 2 , that mechanism cannot operate, and b does not 
appear at all in the condition for vertical social learning to 
invade. We might predict that behaviors that are life-or-death 
matters for one’s successful reproduction are more likely to 
be learned from parents than from nonparents.
All of these predictions could be translated to help in the 
study of diverse taxa. Many researchers now agree that social 
learning of some kind is taxonomically broad (Fragaszy and 
Perry 2003). Models like these should be able to make pre­
dictions about which species will show which kinds of social 
learning, as well as how social structure may influence non- 
genetic evolution. For example, a species that lives in mainly 
parent-offspring social groups should adapt to environmental 
change more slowly than one that lives in larger social groups 
with many nonkin. A species that evolved in a highly un­
predictable environment should be more likely to attend to 
nonparents than one that evolved in a highly stable one.
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